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Estimating the distributional effects 
of mortgage interest tax relief in Europe 
 
1. Introduction 
In the eyes of many researchers (not to speak of lay people), the tax treatment of 
mortgage  interest  payments  must  appear  to  be  of  marginal  importance.  In  many 
ways, e.g. in terms of resources involved, this is true – except, of course, in the 
Netherlands and a few other countries where mortgage interest tax relief is available 
on generous terms. What makes it interesting, at least to this author, is its contested 
nature: its actual effects seem at odds with intended ones, as well as with standard 
arguments  of  efficiency  and  equity.  And  yet,  with  few  (significant)  exceptions, 
mortgage interest tax relief is present throughout Europe, as it is in the rest of the 
developed world. 
This short paper attempts to contribute to the analysis of mortgage interest tax 
relief from the perspective of the economics of social policy. It begins with a brief 
discussion of “fiscal welfare”, highlighting key contributions  within this particular 
intellectual tradition. It then contrasts this largely critical approach to the standard, 
more neutral, treatment of mortgage interest tax relief in the housing literature. 
Finally, the paper draws on both approaches to present on-going research on the 
distributional effects of mortgage interest tax relief in Europe. 
 
2. Mortgage interest tax relief as fiscal welfare 
Over  half  century  ago,  Richard  Titmuss  (1955),  the  LSE  professor  of  social 
administration, drew attention to the fact that conventional social welfare, much 
criticized then as now as a waste of public resources, in fact coexisted alongside 
other forms of welfare, reserved for the more affluent. 
In  particular,  Titmuss  discussed  the  adverse  distributional  effects  of  “fiscal 
welfare”, or tax concessions for the purchase of occupational, private or voluntary 
welfare. As he noted: 
“Since the introduction of progressive taxation in 1907 there 
has been a remarkable development of social policy operating 
through  the  medium  of  the  fiscal  system.”  (Titmuss,  1955, 
p.65)  
Many years later, Julian Le Grand (1997), the current holder of the Richard 
Titmuss  Chair  at  LSE,  discussed  “fiscal  welfare”  in  the  form  of  tax  relief  and 
summarized the issues involved as follows: 
“Tax  relief  is  both  regressive  and  a  blunt  instrument:  it 
favours higher rate taxpayers, it does not benefit those who 
do not pay tax, it encourages lots of tax-avoidance schemes 
that  have  little  to  do  with  the  essential  tasks  of  social 
security, and its cost is difficult to control.” (Le Grand, 1997, 
p.166) 
Mortgage  interest  tax  relief,  described  by  Howard  Glennerster  (professor  of 
social policy at LSE) as “the largest pro-rich tax advantage of all tax reliefs” (2003, 
p.164), appears to exemplify these traits. 
In the meantime, the economist Nicholas Barr (another LSE professor), in the 
first  edition  of  The  economics  of  the  welfare  state,  called  for  “the  phased   2
withdrawal  of  tax  reliefs  for  owner  occupiers,  price  subsidies  to  local  authority 
tenants and the implied price subsidy of rent control”. He also proposed a system of 
“publicly  provided  loans  or  loan  guarantees  for  individuals  who  have  difficulty  in 
obtaining an adequate mortgage in the private sector”, and suggested that “over 
time  price  subsidies  should  be  replaced  by  income  subsidies  in  all  sectors  of  the 
housing market” (Barr, 1987, p.410). 
In  later  editions  of  the  same  book,  published  after  the  privatisation  of 
thousands of council flats and the complete abolition of mortgage interest tax relief 
in Britain, there was no housing chapter. As its author explained: 
“Over the intervening years, that shift in policy has largely 
taken place, so that housing is now largely allocated by the 
market. That is the right strategic direction, since inadequate 
housing  is  far  less  a  market-allocation  problem  than  an 
income  distribution  problem;  what  prevents  people  making 
efficient  choices  is  not  a  shortage  of  information  but  a 
shortage of income. From an economic perspective, the main 
housing problem is how to make it possible for people on low 
incomes  to  afford  decent  accommodation  and,  for  that 
reason, assistance with housing costs is discussed as part of 
poverty  relief.  Other  –  substantial  –  problems  with  housing 
raise  issues  about  which  economics  does  not  have  a  lot  to 
say.” (Barr, 2004, p.222) 
So  far  so  unproblematic.  Nevertheless,  in  an  early  attempt  to  estimate  the 
distributional effects of housing subsidies, John Hills (also at the LSE) noted some of 
the complications: 
“It is one thing to measure differences between the actual 
and idealised treatment of housing for a particular individual 
or  group,  but  quite  another  to  argue  that  they  really 
‘benefit’ or ‘lose’ as a result of these differences. If supply is 
inelastic, the result of tax concessions to owner-occupiers will 
be, at least to some extent, to raise house prices beyond the 
level they would otherwise have been. New purchasers may 
receive the tax concessions, but they need to pay the inflated 
purchase  costs  and  may  (in  the  extreme)  be  no  better  off 
than they would have been if the tax concession had never 
existed in the first place (they would nonetheless lose if the 
concessions were withdrawn).” (Hills, 1991, p.331) 
Hills used a tax-benefit model to estimate the direct first-round effects of tax 
advantages  to  owner-occupiers  (1991,  p.344  ff),  and  found  that  in  terms  of 
distributional impact: 
“Owner-occupiers’ tax advantages … [were] rather low for the 
lowest  income  groups  (non-taxpayers),  rising  slowly  with 
income for most of the income distribution, but rising sharply 
for the highest income groups (with higher tax rates and more 
valuable properties).” (Hills, 1991, p.346) 
Hills’ work was remarkable for its comprehensiveness. He looked at all housing 
subsidies, irrespective of whether they concerned owner-occupiers or local authority 
tenants.  With  respect  to  tenants,  he  examined  housing  benefits  as  well  as  rent 
subisidies;  with  respect  to  owner-occupiers,  he  took  care  to  analyse  mortgage   3
interest tax relief together with non-taxation of imputed rents (and actually found 
the  former  slightly  less  valuable  than  the  latter).  This  stemmed  from  a  greater 
familiarity with the subtleties of housing finance – to which we now turn. 
 
3. Mortgage interest tax relief as an instrument of housing policy 
What the above shows is that a full analysis of mortgage interest tax relief cannot 
ignore wider considerations of housing policy and housing taxation. Not surprisingly, 
this idea is more fully developed in the housing literature itself. 
 
Housing taxation 
As Haffner (2002), among others, has explained, the tax system may treat the owner-
occupied dwelling either as a consumption good or as an investment good. In the 
latter case, logical consistency requires that imputed rent is taxed as income and 
mortgage interest payments are tax deductible. In the former case, there ought to 
be no taxation of imputed rent and, by the same token, no mortgage interest tax 
relief. 
Do  real  tax  systems  conform  to  type?  The  information  compiled  in  Housing 
Statistics in the European Union 2005/2006 suggests that, in several countries where 
imputed  rent  taxation  is  present  the  deductibility  of  mortgage  interest  payments 
from taxable income is also allowed – while, conversely, the absence of mortgage 
interest tax relief often accompanies that of imputed rent taxation. According to this 
source, Austria, France, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom have adopted the 
consumption good approach. In contrast, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands appear to apply the investment good approach. 
Nevertheless, many countries deviate from that rule. In Latvia and the Slovak 
Republic, no mortgage interest tax relief is combined with taxation of imputed rent. 
On the other hand, in the Czech Republic, Finland, Ireland, Malta, Poland, Portugal 
and Sweden, where imputed rent is not taxed, mortgage interest tax relief is still 
available. In fact, according to other accounts, membership of this category may be 
even  more  numerous  than  that:  in  Austria  mortgage  interest  payments  tax  is 
deductible up to a limit that diminishes as income rises, in Denmark imputed rent 
taxation was replaced by a property tax in 2000, in France mortgage interest tax 
relief was partly restored in 2007, while in Spain the tax deductibility of mortgage 
interest payments is partly available. 
This observation raises several issues, the least original of which is that official 
statistics may actually contain errors. Crucially, tax policy as applied in practice is 
often inconsistent with the consumption/investment good dichotomy. Policy makers 
may disregard principles of housing taxation for good reasons, or simply because they 
are biased in favour of owner occupation. 
Moreover,  actual  tax  rules  are  complex,  and  details  matter.  The  size  and 
distribution of tax advantages to owner-occupiers differ greatly between the polar 
cases of Austria (where, as mentioned above, the generosity of mortgage interest tax 
relief is inversely related to annual income) and the Netherlands (where mortgage 
interest payments are fully deductible from taxable income, at the marginal rate of 
income tax). 
In  any  case,  the  point  that  there  is  more  to  housing  taxation  than  simply 
mortgage interest tax relief was recently reiterated by Saarima (2010):   4
“The  nature  of  mortgage  interest  deduction  is  often 
misunderstood.  The  fundamental  tax  advantage  that 
homeowners receive in Finland and in many western countries 
is  not  the  deductibility  of  mortgage  interest  but  the  non-
taxation  of  imputed  rental  income  and  capital  gains.  The 
removal of mortgage interest deduction would not eliminate 
the fundamental tax advantage but would tilt the advantage 
in favour of those wealthy and high-income households who 
are less dependent on debt financing in home acquisition. The 
deductibility of mortgage interest can be seen as a way to 
extend the tax advantage to those who must rely on mortgage 
financing in order to purchase a home.” (Saarima, 2010, p.20) 
In other words, mortgage interest tax relief is not the villain of the piece – at 
least not the only one, or not as much as others. Even though it may at first sight 
appear to favour the better off, what in fact does is to extend access to owner-




The answer depends on the degree of capitalisation, i.e. the extent to which tax 
advantages are already reflected in house prices. Under full capitalisation, changes 
in  mortgage  interest  tax  relief  are  exactly  matched  by  changes  in  house  prices. 
Improving the generosity of tax relief causes mortgage demand to increase, leading 
to increases in housing demand, causing house prices to rise. Conversely, reducing 
(or abolishing) mortgage interest tax relief would simply cause house prices to fall; 
at an extreme, the reduction in the real wealth of owner-occupiers could give rise to 
the phenomenon known as “negative equity trap” – which is what happens when the 
value of a mortgaged dwelling falls below the level of outstanding mortgage debt. In 
other words, under full capitalisation mortgage interest tax relief has none of its 
intended  effects:  it  makes  housing  no  more  affordable  to  new  buyers,  it  merely 
amounts to a pure transfer from the public purse to current owners of houses on 
sale. 
Economic  theory  suggests  that  for  full  capitalisation  to  occur  the  supply  of 
housing  would  have  to  be  entirely  inelastic.  Empirical  evidence  on  this  is  rather 
mixed. 
On the one hand, some studies have indicated that the degree of capitalisation 
may be very high. Berger et al. (2000) analysed Swedish data on 300,000 house sales 
from 1981 to 1993; their conclusion was that interest subsidies are fully capitalised 
into house prices. Brounen and Neuteboom (2008) estimated that almost 75% of the 
fiscal  subsidy  associated  with  mortgage  interest  tax  relief  in  the  Netherlands  is 
reflected in house prices. Most recently, Saarima (2010) analysed the effects of the 
1993  Finnish  tax  on  the  demand  for  mortgage  debt;  she  found  that  high-income 
households, with high marginal tax rates, responded to the reduced tax incentives by 
clearly reducing their mortgage borrowing compared to the control group. She also 
cited evidence from other Nordic countries where a similar effect was estimated. 
On the other hand, other studies have found that the relevant effect is limited. 
Jappelli  and  Pistaferri  (2007)  analysed  changes  in  the  tax  treatment  of  mortgage 
interest payments in Italy in 1992-94; they concluded that tax considerations did not 
affect  the  demand  for  mortgage  debt,  either  at  the  extensive  margin  (i.e.  the   5
decision to take out a mortgage), or at the intensive margin (i.e. the size of the 
mortgage taken out). Bourassa and Grigsby (2000) cited estimates that put the rate 
of capitalisation in the USA at around 14%; on the basis of that finding, they argued 
that if mortgage interest payments were no longer deductible, the effect on house 
prices can be expected to be just as modest. Boelhouwer et al. (2004) reviewed 
developments  in  a  number  of  European  countries;  they  found  that  changes  in 
taxation in the Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, Germany, France and the UK had no 
effect on house prices. Tax changes did seem to correlate with falling house prices in 
Sweden and Denmark, but the extent to which the two developments were causally 
linked  is  debatable,  since  the  changes  in  taxation  took  effect  as  the  economy 
plunged into a recession. In view of that, they argued that what really matters is that 
changes in housing taxation are gradually implemented and judiciously timed, and 
concluded that: 
“The fear that deterioration of the deductibility of mortgage 
interest payments will lead to sharp drops in the house prices 
might well be exaggerated.” (Boelhouwer et al., 2004, p.431)  
How can these findings be reconciled? Part of the difficulty in establishing the 
effect of tax changes on house prices is that other factors are at work at the same 
time (e.g. changes in actual or expected incomes). Alternatively, or as a result of 
such factors, it may simply be that the relation itself varies with time and between 
countries.  For  example,  Swank  et  al.  (2002)  estimated  price  elasticities  of  new 
housing supply in six countries; they found that these were lower in the Netherlands 
(0.30), the UK (0.45) and Denmark (0.66), and higher in France (1.09), the US (1.30) 
and Germany (2.40). High elasticities of supply suggest that the main effect of tax 
advantages  is  to  increase  housing  consumption  in  quantitative  terms.  Conversely, 
price elasticities of supply close to zero imply that the degree of capitalisation tends 
to 100%, as a result of which tax advantages fail to render owner-occupied housing 
more affordable. 
 
Volatility of housing markets 
This  raises  a  related  point.  How  wise  is  encouraging  the  demand  for  mortgages 
anyway? As Neuteboom (2004) has argued: 
“In recent years, numerous agencies, including the European 
Central  Bank  […],  have  warned  of  the  risks  of  excessive 
mortgage takeup, not only for owner-occupiers but also for 
the financial sector, and the possible destabilization of the 
economy as a whole.” (Neuteboom, 2004, p.184) 
In fact, empirical research, reviewed in Wolswijk (2006), has shown that the 
variability in house prices is greatest where tax subsidies are largest. At the extreme, 
tax concessions contribute to the creation of “mortgage bubbles”, leading to house 
price bubbles. By implication, abolishing or at least restricting the preferential tax 
treatment of housing loans might help stabilize the housing market. In his words: 
“Structural  reductions  in  mortgage  interest  tax  relief, 
lowering mortgage demand at given interest rates, could have 
a beneficial impact on housing market volatility.” (Wolswijk, 
2006, p.143)   6
This takes us back to our point of departure. Regardless of whether mortgage 
interest tax relief is desirable or even effective as an instrument of housing policy, 
how can we estimate its distributional effects? 
 
4. Estimating the distributional effects of mortgage interest tax relief in Europe 
The fact that on a priori grounds the distributional effect of mortgage interest tax 
relief is expected to be regressive might seem to make the closer investigation of 
this effect an interesting research question with significant policy implications. On 
the contrary, the topic has been largely ignored outside Britain (Clark and Leicester, 
2004; Hills, 1991), with few exceptions (see Callan et al., 2006, for  Ireland, and 
Baldini, 2008, for Italy; see also Poterba and Sinai, 2008, for the USA). This paper 
reports on on-going research hoping to fill part of this gap. 
 
A European tax-benefit model 
The estimation of first-round distributional effects of mortgage interest tax relief 
relies  on  EUROMOD,  a  comparative  cross-country  tax-benefit  model.  The  model 
simulates a variety of taxes and benefits in the EU: income taxes, social insurance 
contributions,  housing  allowances,  unemployed  benefits,  family  benefits,  social 
assistance benefits and some social insurance benefits. EUROMOD covers so far 19 
member states. 
At  the  time  being,  EUROMOD  applies  policy  rules  to  the  original  micro-data 
drawn from a variety of sources, including national household budget surveys and 
income  distribution  surveys.  Where  necessary,  income  data  are  updated  using 
appropriate adjustment factors by country and by income source. The policy rules 
simulated here refer to the year 2003, except for Denmark, Sweden, Ireland and Italy 
(2001). 
Household  income  is  equivalised;  that  is,  differences  in  household  size  and 
composition  are  dealt  with  by  applying  the  modified  OECD  equivalence  scale, 
assigning a value of 1.0 to the first adult, of 0.3 to children below 14, and of 0.5 to 
additional household members. In line with standard practice, income is assumed to 
be shared equally among household members. For more information on Euromod see 
Sutherland (2007), or visit the website of Microsimulation Unit, University of Essex 
(http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/msu). 
The main advantages of relying on EUROMOD for the purpose of this research 
are twofold. On the one hand, the effect of income tax (and associated tax reliefs) 
would be impossible to read off the original data in the absence of a tax-benefit 
model. On the other hand, when the research concerns cross-country comparisons, as 
here,  a  harmonised  tax-benefit  model  specifically  constructed  to  ensure 
comparability  can  be  expected  to  be  more  reliable  than  a  collection  of  almost 
inevitably heterogeneous national tax-benefit models. 
There  are  disadvantages,  however.  EUROMOD is  a  static  model,  based  upon 
purely  arithmetical  calculations.  For  this  reason,  when  simulating  the  effects  of 
policy  changes,  the  model  is  unable  to  take  behavioural  responses  into  account. 
Behavioural responses may be related to consumption, labour supply or, more to the 
point given the focus of this paper, investment and savings. 
Furthermore, the application of policy rules to a given population implies that 
these rules are fully adhered to. Of course, this is not true in the real world. It is   7
known that not all individuals pay the taxes they are liable to; in fact, tax evasion 
constitutes a serious issue in several countries (see Matsaganis et al., 2009). Again, 
no adjustment is made to the data, as if the incomes reported in the surveys on 
which  the  model  relies  were  exactly  the  same  as  the  incomes  declared  to  the 
authorities for the purposes of assessing both liability to income tax and eligibility to 
income-related benefits. The implications of these assumptions are discussed later 
on in the paper. 
 
Previous work 
An  early  study  (Matsaganis  and  Flevotomou,  2007a)  compared  the  size  and 
distribution of mortgage interest tax relief to that  of housing benefits in five EU 
countries: Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden. We found that while 
housing benefits were reasonably well targeted to low income housholds, mortgage 
interest  tax  relief  was  disproportionally  captured  by  higher  income  groups.  In 
aggregate terms, tax expenditure on the latter far exceeded public spending on the 
former. 
A  second  study  (Matsaganis  and  Flevotomou,  2007b)  evaluated  the 
distributional effects of a hypothetical reform, replacing both mortgage interest tax 
relief  and  housing  benefits  by  a  universal  tenure-neutral  budget-neutral  housing 
transfer. We contrasted Sweden, where the regressive effect of current policies was 
relatively  modest,  to  the  Netherlands,  where  it  was  more  extreme.  Our  finding 
emphasised  the  importance  of  the  structure  and  design  of  mortgage  interest  tax 
relief for distributional outcomes. 
A third study focused on mortgage interest tax relief alone, but extended the 
analysis to ten West European countries, i.e. the EU-15 minus France, Germany and 
Britain  (where  tax  relief  is  no  longer  available),  as  well  as  Austria  and  Belgium 
(where data quality was poor). The main findings of that study are presented below. 
Our estimation of the distribution of tax foregone due to mortgage interest tax 
relief  is  shown  in  Table  1.  It  is  immediately  clear  that  the  first-round  effects  of 
mortgage interest tax relief are favourable to higher income groups. Specifically, out 
of €100 of tax foregone, between €33 (Sweden) and €57 (Greece) go to the richest 
20% of households. By contrast, nowhere does the corresponding share of the poorest 
fifth of households exceed 5%, except by a little (5.5%) in Sweden. 
[TABLE 1] 
Similarly, Table 2 shows the income share of mortgage interest tax relief by 
quintile. In other words, the denominator this time is each quintile’s total disposable 
income, rather than total tax foregone due to mortgage interest tax relief as before. 
As  far  as  the  bottom  quintile  is  concerned,  the  contribution  of  mortgage 
interest  tax  relief  to  disposable  incomes  is  negligible  everywhere  except  in  the 
Netherlands (1.3%), Denmark and Sweden (both 1.6%). Conversely, the corresponding 
figures for the top quintile nudge towards 0.7% (Finland) or 0.8% (Spain), and go up 
to  4.3%  (the  Netherlands)  and  5.4%  (Denmark).  In  general,  income  shares  rise 
monotonically with income, either all the way to the top of the income distribution, 
as  in  the  cases  of  the  Netherlands  and  Denmark,  or  only  up  to  quintile  4,  as  in 
Finland, Spain and Sweden.   8
Overall,  the  relative  weight  of  mortgage  interest  tax  relief  is  4.0%  of  total 
household disposable income in Denmark, 3.5% in the Netherlands, 2.6% in Sweden, 
0.8% in Spain and Finland, and less than 0.5% in all other countries. 
[TABLE 2] 
The distribution of tax foregone by income quintile, both as a proportion of 
total tax expenditure on mortgage interest tax relief and as a proportion of each 
quintile’s income, shown above in Tables 1 and 2 respectively, gives a strong first 
impression of the distributional impact of mortgage interest tax relief. A more formal 
assessment  based  on  standard  indices  of  tax  progressivity  and  income  inequality 
reinforces  this  impression.  In  this  work,  we  relied  on  three  indices  of  tax 
progressivity (Kakwani, Reynolds-Smolensky and Suits), as well as the Gini inequality 
index. 
More specifically, the Kakwani index of liability progression, an index of tax 
redistribution progressivity, is defined as the difference between the concentration 
curve of mortgage tax relief and the Lorenz curve of current disposable incomes less 
mortgage tax relief. The Reynolds-Smolensky index of residual progression an index 
of  income  redistribution  progressivity  and  vertical  equity,  is  defined  as  the 
difference between the concentration curve of current disposable incomes (that is, 
including mortgage tax relief) and the Lorenz curve of current disposable incomes 
less mortgage tax relief. Finally, the Suits index is simply defined as S = 1 – (L / K), 
where K denotes the area below the 45
0 diagonal and L the area below the Lorenz 
curve  of  the  tax  burden.  The  values  of  all  three  range  from  +1  (extreme 
progressivity) to –1 (extreme regressivity), with 0 indicating a strictly proportional 
effect (Duclos & Araar, 2006; Lambert, 1993). The results are shown in Table 3. 
[TABLE 3] 
Clearly,  the  redistributive  effect  of  abolishing  mortgage  interest  tax  relief 
would be to make the tax systems of all ten countries more progressive. Specifically, 
the  values  of  the  Reynolds-Smolensky  index  suggest  that  this  effect  would  be 
strongest in Denmark, the Netherlands and, to some extent, in Sweden. By contrast, 
the values of the Kakwani index indicate that departures from proportionality caused 
by mortgage interest tax relief are greatest in Luxembourg and Greece. Finally, the 
values of the Suit index show that abolishing the tax relief in question would most 
enhance tax progressivity in Luxembourg and Greece again, followed by Denmark and 
the Netherlands. These findings confirm that among the three countries where the 
relative weight of mortgage interest tax relief is greatest, its distributional impact is 
most regressive in Denmark and the Netherlands, and least regressive in Sweden. 
This is in line with our findings concerning inequality. Comparing the values of 
the Gini coefficient with and without mortgage interest tax relief demonstrates that 
its  abolition  would  reduce  income  inequality  appreciably  in  the  Netherlands  and 
Denmark, slightly in Sweden, and marginally in the other seven countries. 
 
5. Further research 
The main issues facing our future research on the distributional effects of mortgage 
interest tax relief in Europe concern the treatment of imputed rent taxation and 
extending the coverage of the European tax-benefit model EUROMOD.   9
 
The treatment of imputed rent taxation 
What the preceding discussion suggests is that mortgage interest tax relief should not 
be analysed in isolation: a fuller treatment requires that, at the very least, taxation 
of imputed rents is also taken in consideration. 
Nevertheless, this has not been possible so far. Data on imputed rents are not 
readily available in any of the existing datasets. Recent efforts to report information 
on  imputed  rents  as  part  of  EU-SILC  have  run  into  considerable  problems  of 
consistency of definitions and comparability across countries. 
In  view  of  that,  the  size  and  distribution  of  imputed  rents  can  only  be 
estimated in the context of research specifically conducted for that purpose. For 
example, Frick et al. (2007) recently produced estimates of the value of imputed 
rent as income in kind in seven European countries. 
In any case, from the point of view of this research, actual rules of imputed 
rent taxation typically use notional property values varying greatly across locations. 
Because of this, analysing distributional effects of imputed rent taxation often defies 
microsimulation, since it requires more information than is currently available. 
 
Extending the coverage of EUROMOD 
While  EUROMOD  currently  covers  19  EU  countries,  under  EUROMOD  update 
(http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/research/euromod/developing-euromodeuromodupdate),  a 
development  project  funded  by  the  European  Commission  (Directorate  General 
Employment,  Social  Affairs,  and  Equal  Opportunities),  coverage  is  being  gradually 
extended to all 27 member states. Under this project, EUROMOD will run on data 
from the European Union Survey of Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). This work 
is expected to be completed by January 2012. 
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Table 1. Distribution of tax expenditure on mortgage interest tax relief 









(richest)  All 
Denmark  4.1  9.4  17.0  24.8  44.6  100 
Finland  3.8  11.3  20.0  28.6  36.3  100 
Greece  0.0  2.5  11.9  28.5  57.1  100 
Ireland  1.2  9.2  18.2  26.7  44.6  100 
Italy  0.6  3.9  21.5  30.9  43.0  100 
Luxembourg  1.6  4.0  12.5  39.8  42.2  100 
Netherlands  3.6  10.8  17.2  25.9  42.5  100 
Portugal  0.2  4.8  17.2  29.7  48.1  100 
Spain  1.4  11.8  20.6  28.5  37.8  100 
Sweden  5.5  12.8  20.3  28.1  33.3  100 
 
Notes:  Tax expenditure on mortgage interest tax relief by quintile as proportion of total 
expenditure on mortgage interest tax relief. The unit of analysis is individuals 
ranked  by  non-decreasing  net  household  disposable  income.  Expenditure  on 
mortgage interest tax relief and disposable income are adjusted for household 
size using the modified OECD equivalence scale. Reference year is 2003 (2001 for 
Denmark, Ireland, Italy and Sweden). 
Source:  Own calculations using EUROMOD.   11
 
Table 2. Income share of mortgage interest tax relief 









(richest)  All 
Denmark  1.6  2.5  3.7  4.4  5.4  4.0 
Finland  0.3  0.6  0.8  1.0  0.7  0.8 
Greece  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.2 
Ireland  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1 
Italy  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.2  0.2 
Luxembourg  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.1 
Netherlands  1.3  2.6  3.3  3.9  4.3  3.5 
Portugal  0.0  0.2  0.5  0.6  0.5  0.4 
Spain  0.1  0.7  1.0  1.0  0.8  0.8 
Sweden  1.6  2.2  2.8  3.2  2.5  2.6 
 
Notes:  Tax expenditure on mortgage interest tax relief as proportion of net household 
disposable income by quintile. The unit of analysis is individuals ranked by non-
decreasing net household disposable income. Expenditure on mortgage interest 
tax  relief  and  disposable  income  are  adjusted  for  household  size  using  the 
modified  OECD  equivalence  scale.  Reference  year  is  2003  (2001  for  Denmark, 
Ireland, Italy and Sweden). 
Source:  Own calculations using EUROMOD.   12
 
Table 3. Distributional impact of mortgage interest tax relief 
 
Progressivity  Inequality 
Kakwani  Reynolds-






Denmark  0.133  0.0056  0.182  0.232  0.225  -2.85 
Finland  0.071  0.0005  0.044  0.269  0.268  -0.16 
Greece  0.230  0.0004  0.254  0.323  0.323  -0.15 
Ireland  0.093  0.0001  0.091  0.321  0.321  -0.04 
Italy  0.144  0.0003  0.112  0.319  0.318  -0.08 
Luxembourg  0.233  0.0002  0.195  0.243  0.243  -0.09 
Netherlands  0.102  0.0037  0.147  0.247  0.243  -1.84 
Portugal  0.168  0.0007  0.095  0.361  0.360  -0.16 
Spain  0.063  0.0005  0.034  0.311  0.311  -0.11 
Sweden  0.051  0.0013  0.034  0.251  0.250  -0.26 
 
Notes:  The  Kakwani,  Reynolds-Smolensky  and  Suits  indices  measure  the  effect  the 
abolition of mortgage interest tax relief would have on income tax progressivity 
(ceteris paribus). ‘Gini baseline’ refers to the current income distribution, while 
‘Gini reform’  refers to the income distribution resulting from the abolition  of 
mortgage  interest  tax  relief  (again,  ceteris  paribus)  .  Reference  year  is  2003 
(2001 for Denmark, Ireland, Italy and Sweden). 
Source:  Own calculations using EUROMOD.   13
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